We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.
Introduction
One of the most fruitful applications of game theory into political sciences is the study of power in decision making bodies. Typically, power is understood as the ability of an agent to affect the outcome of a voting procedure. A number of power indices have been proposed in the literature to quantify this ability. The most relevant of these measures are the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1964) . Both of them build on a common underlying assumption: members of a legislature (be they individuals or parties) may form coalitions, and a coalition is winning if and only if the votes of its members account for at least as many as an exogenously given threshold (most often the majority). Accordingly, the bargaining possibilities of the members of a legislature can be described by a simple coalitional game, which assigns 1 to winning coalitions and 0 to the rest.
Nevertheless, quite often there are voting procedures in legislatures in which endogenous majority rules are used instead of fixed majority rules. For instance, when the proclamation of the president is a duty of the parliament and no candidate receives the support of at least half of the legislature, governments backed by only a minority of the legislators may be formed.
1 In these cases, the minority government takes hold because the parties that do not back it cannot agree on voting in favor of an alternative candidate. When endogenous voting rules apply, the bargaining possibilities of the parties cannot be fully captured by a coalitional game. The reason is the following: whether a coalition of parties is winning or not is not only determined by how many seats the coalition has, but also by the voting strategies of the remaining parties.
To encompass situations like the previous one, Thrall and Lucas (1963) devised the so-called partition function form games. In a partition function form game, the value of a coalition depends on how the players outside the coalition are organized, hence allowing for externalities to be incorporated into the framework of coalitional games. Some years later, Myerson (1977) proposed and characterized an extension of the Shapley value for partition function form games.
It has only been in the later times, however, that these games have gained importance and some relevant contributions on the topic have been made. For instance, Hafalir (2007) studies the core of coalitional games with externalities and obtains necessary conditions for its nonemptiness. The problem of extending the Shapley value to games in partition function form has captured great attention and several alternatives to Myerson (1977) have been proposed. First, Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) characterize a value that can be obtained as the Shapley payoffs of an average game. Second, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) follow an axiomatic approach to single out a value that is not affected by externalities. Third, Dutta et al. (2010) provide a family of values using the notion of potential and characterize it by means of a reduced game property (see Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) ). Other recent contributions include Albizuri et al. (2005) and
Pham Do and Norde (2007) . To the best of our knowledge, however, no extension of the Banzhaf value has been yet proposed within the framework of all games in partition function form.
The Banzhaf value was first proposed for voting games (Banzhaf, 1964; Penrose, 1946) and later on extended to the class of all coalitional games by Owen (1975) . As for the Shapley value, marginal contributions of players to coalitions are the basis of the Banzhaf value. However, whereas the Shapley value considers orderings of players, the Banzhaf value considers coalitions of players. From an axiomatic perspective, the main difference is that the Shapley value is efficient while the Banzhaf value satisfies interesting amalgamation neutrality properties (Haller, 1994; Nowak, 1997; Casajus, 2012) .
In the first part of this paper, we propose a family of values for arbitrary games in partition function form that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to an expected coalitional game.
Our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of players. Then, we provide two characterization results of these values by means of an appealing amalgamation neutrality property.
In the second part of the paper, we focus on partition function form games which are simple.
As the collusion transformation used in the above characterization results fails to be meaningful for this subclass of games, we propose another family of values for arbitrary games of partition function form which are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to a different expected coalitional game. These latter values are then characterized similarly as the former ones, with the modification that the previous amalgamation property is substituted by a different version that uses a collusion transformation for which simple games are closed. Both families of values coincide when there are no externalities.
We note that, in the framework of simple games with externalities, different extensions of the Banzhaf value have been studied. The paper with the most similar motivation to ours is Bolger (1990) , where an extension of the Banzhaf value is proposed and characterized for multi-candidate voting games. Specifically, Bolger (1990) studies values that can be defined as weighted averages of marginal contributions, and he characterizes one particular value. When restricted to simple games, our family of indices is not included within the class of values studied by Bolger (1990) , although, very interestingly, it satisfies the dummy-independence property of his characterization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the first family of values for games in partition function form. In Section 3, we prove two characterization results.
In Section 4, we turn our interest to simple games in partition function form, and we present and characterize the second family of values for games in partition function form.
A Banzhaf-based value
Let Ω be a (possibly infinite) set of potential players. We denote by N ⊆ Ω any finite set of players in Ω. We denote the cardinality of N by n. A partition of N , denoted by P , is a division of N into pairwise disjoint coalitions, i.e., P ⊆ {S : S ⊆ N } such that ∪ S∈P = N and for every S, T ∈ P with S = T , S ∩ T = ∅. By convenience, we assume that the empty set is an element of every partition. We denote by P(N ) the set of all partitions of the finite set N . An embedded coalition of N is a pair (S, P ) where P ∈ P(N ) and S ∈ P . The set of embedded coalitions of N is EC N = {(S, P ) : P ∈ P(N ) and S ∈ P }. Given S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , S −i (resp. S +i ) stands for the set S \ {i} (resp. S ∪ {i}). Similarly, given P ∈ P(N ) and S ∈ P , P −S ∈ P(N \ S) denotes the partition P \ {S}.
A game in partition function form (or simply a game) is a pair (N, v) , where N ⊆ Ω and v is a function that assigns to every embedded coalition its "worth", i.e., v : EC N → R, with the convention that for every P ∈ P(N ), v(∅, P ) = 0. The set of all games in partition function form with common player set N is denoted by G N . The set of games in partition function form with an arbitrary set of players is denoted by G, i.e.,
From de Clippel and Serrano (2008), we know that {(N, e (S,P ) ) : (S, P ) ∈ EC N and S = ∅} constitutes a basis of G N . Lastly, given H ⊆ G, a value on H is any mapping, f, that assigns to
A family of values
In the following, we define a new family of values for games in partition function form. To do so, we require further concepts. For every N ⊆ Ω, let λ N : EC N → R + be such that for every
I.e., λ N yields, for any S ⊆ N , a probability distribution over the set (R, P ) ∈ EC N : R = S .
Alternatively, we can interpret that λ N contains the frequencies with which different coalition structures arise. This second interpretation has a special appeal when we consider the example of the legislature outlined in the Introduction. Indeed, coalitions formed in a parliament among parties vary depending on the bill being voted, and hence λ N summarizes the average behavior of parties in terms of voting alliances.
We impose two technical conditions. First, we require that the above distributions depend only on the set of players not in S, i.e., for every N,
We denote by Λ any set of collections of probability distributions, one for each possible player set, satisfying Eq. (2), i.e.,
The idea behind (3) is to assume that there is an exogenously given belief on how any set of players organizes itself into a coalition structure.
Second, we say that Λ is consistent if for every N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N , and (S,
Thus, Λ is consistent if given some S ⊆ N −j , the probability that players in N −j \S are organized according to P −S is independent of whether we consider j or not. Lastly, we use L to denote the set of all consistent Λ. We stress that there exist infinitely many such Λ.
Example 2.1. In this example, we introduce two possible beliefs, Λ, that satisfy Eqs. (2) and (4). By notational convenience, for
Similarly, let Λ * * be such that for every N ⊆ Ω and
It is straightforward to see that Λ * , Λ * * ∈ L. In a monotone context, Λ * represents the pessimistic belief, whereas Λ * * is the optimistic one. In such a context, they constitute the two polar cases.
Following the average approach used in Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) , given Λ ∈ L, N ⊆ Ω and
we can associate a number with any coalition S ⊆ N by considering the expected
In a sense, we have incorporated to the game the beliefs on the possible externalities that may arise. We are now in the position to introduce our family of values, one for every Λ ∈ L.
The values in (6) are built by means of a two-step procedure. First, the beliefs obtained from Λ are used to define the average coalitional game (N, v Λ ). Second, we consider the Banzhaf value of the latter game. Observe that, even though our approach is very similar to Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) , the assumptions on the weights differ from those they consider. The reason is that we work with variable player sets, as the next section will make it more evident. Moreover, we do not consider that the above weights are independent of the identity of the players.
Characterizations of the Λ-Banzhaf value
In what follows, we consider some properties that a value for games in partition function form may satisfy. In order to introduce the first two properties, we consider an adaptation of the dummy player property to our setting. Given Λ ∈ L and N ⊆ Ω, we say that i ∈ N is a
or, equivalently,
That is, i is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v) ∈ G if the value she expects to add to any coalition is, according to the probability distribution given by Λ, equal to the value she expects to obtain when she remains a singleton.
Λ-dpp Given Λ ∈ L, a value, f, satisfies the Λ-dummy player property if for every N ⊆ Ω and
For convenience, we consider coalitional games (without externalities) as a subclass of games in partition function form. Formally, (N, v) ∈ G is a coalitional game if for every S ⊆ N and
In the case of coalitional games, we may simply denote by v(S) the worth obtained by any coalition S ⊆ N , which is independent of how the remaining players organize themselves. The set of all coalitional games with common player set N ⊆ Ω is denoted by CG N . If we let
there are no externalities,
it is so for every Λ ∈ L. In such a situation, we will simply say that i is a dummy player in (N, v) with no reference to Λ. Next, we introduce a weaker version of Λ-dpp, obtained from demanding it only to games in CG.
dpp(w) A value, f, satisfies the dummy player property in the weak sense if for every N ⊆ Ω, (N, v) ∈ CG such that i ∈ N is a dummy player in (N, v),
In the following, we introduce a property that considers a certain merging of players. Given j, and (N, v) ∈ G N , the {ij}-reduced game, which we denote
otherwise. That is, (N −j , v (Λ,ij) ) is the resulting game in partition function form obtained from (N, v) when j delegates her role on i. More precisely, when i participates in a given coalition, then j goes along with her. However, when i does not participate in a coalition we compute the expected value that is obtained when j joins any other coalition updating the beliefs with Bayes' rule. When no confusion may arise we will denote (N −j , v (Λ,ij) ) simply by (N −j , v ij ).
Λ-dnp Given Λ ∈ L, a value, f, satisfies the Λ-delegation neutrality property if for every N ⊆ Ω, (N, v) ∈ G, and i, j ∈ N , with i = j,
no externalities by Haller (1994) . Recently, Casajus (2012) used the latter to characterize the Banzhaf value. 4 In the particular case of two-player games, i.e., when N = {i, j} with i = j, externalities cannot arise as the only partitions are {∅, {i}, {j}} and {∅, {i, j}}. Hence, the set of games in partition function form coincides in this case with the set of coalitional games. The property below only applies to two-player games.
2-psp A value, f, satisfies the 2-player standard payoff property if for every i, j ∈ Ω with i = j and ({i, j}, v) ∈ G {i,j} ,
A value satisfying 2-psp gives for two-player games the payoffs prescribed by many common solution concepts, like the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value or the nucleolus.
In the following we prove a series of results which lead to two characterization results of the family of Λ-Banzhaf values by means of Λ-dnp.
Proposition 3.1. Let Λ ∈ L. Then, the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies Λ-dpp, Λ-dnp and 2-psp.
where the first equality holds by definition of Ba Λ and the second equality from the fact that i is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v) . Second, let j ∈ N −i . Then,
where the first and last equalities hold from the definition of Ba Λ , the second equality holds because Ba satisfies the 2-efficiency property for coalitional games as considered in Casajus (2012), and the third equality holds if
Hence, it only remains to prove Eq. (11). Let i, j ∈ N , with i = j, and S ⊆ N −j . We distinguish two cases.
4 See Alonso-Meijide et al. (2012) for a comparison in the framework of coalitional games with no externalities between this property and the 2-efficiency property considered by Nowak (1997) . 5 We denote by Ba the Banzhaf value of coalitional games. We note that it can be defined for every (N, v) ∈ CG
, where Λ ∈ L is arbitrary. The {ij}-reduced game for coalitional games is then independent of Λ and coincides with the one used in Casajus (2012).
Case 1: i ∈ S.
On the one hand,
On the other hand,
We note that by setting P = P −S ∪ S +j , we define a one-to-one correspondence between the set of partitions P ∈ P(N −j ) such that S ∈ P and the set of partitions P ∈ P(N ) such that S +j ∈ P . Hence, from the two expressions above and Eq. (2) it follows that
Case 2: i / ∈ S.
where the first (maybe empty) summation after the second equality is taken only for those
When the summation is empty we set it to zero. Under Eq. (4), we obtain (v Λ ) ij (S) = (v ij ) Λ (S).
Third, and last, it is trivial to check that the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies 2-psp.
Next, we provide for every Λ ∈ L two characterizations of the Λ-Banzhaf value in the framework of all games in partition function form. otherwise.
First, we prove uniqueness for two-player games. 7 W.l.o.g., let N = {1, 2} ⊆ Ω and take
Let M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and (M, z) ∈ G M be defined by
(e ({l}, * ) − e (N \{l,4}, * ) ) + (λ 12 + 2λ 2 ) · e ({1,2,3}, * ) . (13) Using (12), it easily follows that
Let now (M −3 , w) ∈ G M−3 , where w = z 13 . By Λ-dnp,
and
From (12) it follows that 1 is a dummy player in the weak sense in ((M −3 ) −2 , w 12 ), implying
where the first equality holds by dpp(w), the second equality by Λ-dnp and the last equality is due to Eqs. (14) and (15). As 1, 2, and 3 play symmetric roles in z, we can repeat the procedure above exchanging the roles of the three players in the definition of z to obtain
Note that, by plugging the above equation into Eqs. (14) and (15), we obtain f 1 (M −3 , w) = λ 2 + λ12 2 . As (M −3 , w) ∈ CG M−3 and 4 is a dummy player in the weak sense in (M −3 , w), by dpp(w) we have
Lastly, observe that (M −3 ) −4 = {1, 2} and, by Eq. (12),
As a consequence,
where the second equality holds by Λ-dnp. Observe that, from (12), we have
Since ({1}, v 12 ) ∈ G {1} and 1 is a dummy player in the weak sense in ({1}, v 12 ),
where the last equality holds by Λ-dnp. Therefore,
Second, suppose that uniqueness holds for every (N , v) ∈ G N where |N | < n (with n > 2) and let (N, v) ∈ G N . 8 By Λ-dnp, it holds, for every i, j ∈ N ,
The right-hand side of Eq. (17) is unique by the inductive hypothesis. Since Eq. (17) holds for every pair i, j ∈ N , with i = j, we have a system of n 2 equations and n unknown variables. It is easy to check that the system has at most one solution. Moreover, by Proposition 3.1 the system is compatible.
A careful analysis of the proof reveals that the result in Proposition 3.2 remains true even if we restrict dpp(w) to apply only to games (N, v) ∈ G N where n ≤ 4. The following result is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Theorem 3.1. Let Λ ∈ L. The Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique value on G that satisfies Λ-dnp and dpp(w).
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The next result shows that the Λ-Banzhaf value can be characterized without the need of a dummy player property.
Theorem 3.2. Let Λ ∈ L. The Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique value on G that satisfies Λ-dnp
and 2-psp.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.2, uniqueness can be shown by induction. The case n = 2 follows immediately from 2-psp. The case n = 1 then follows from the case n = 2 by Λ-dnp. The inductive reasoning for n ≥ 2 is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, as it only depends on Λ-dnp.
Simple Games (and Amalgamation Neutrality)
In this section, we focus our attention on a particular subclass of games in partition function form, the so-called simple games in partition function form. This subclass comprises those games where the worth of any embedded coalition takes only one of two values. To be consistent with the previous literature on simple (coalitional) games, we further demand a certain notion of monotonicity. Formally, for each N ⊆ Ω and (N, v) ∈ G, we consider the following properties:
First, (i) requires that an embedded coalition is either winning (and the value is 1) or losing (and the value is 0). Second, (ii) requires that the grand coalition is always winning. Third, (iii) requires that a winning embedded coalition S can never become losing when more agents join it. A game (N, v) ∈ G is a simple game in partition function form (just simple game) if it satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii). Let SG be the subset of G that consists of simple games.
The class of games just introduced was studied some time ago under the name of multicandidate voting games. Two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for this class of games are proposed in Bolger (1983 Bolger ( , 1986 . Later on, Bolger (1990) characterized one of his proposals within the class of values that can be built using a particular weight system. It is worth to mention that the family of values proposed in the current work does not lie within the class of values considered by Bolger (1990) , although the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies the dummy player property of the characterization. Our model should not be confused with the model of games with r-alternatives (see for instance Freixas and Zwicker (2003) ). The latter is a model that allows for different levels of approval; that is, besides knowing which coalitions are formed, it
is also known what each of the coalitions is voting for. For instance, voting situations where abstention is present can be modelled using a simple game with 3-alternatives.
The Λ-Banzhaf value introduced in Section 2 has been proved in Section 3 to be the only value within the framework of all games in partition function form that is invariant with respect to a certain amalgamation of players, namely Λ-dnp, and that satisfies an additional property, either dpp(w) or 2-psp. When we restrict our attention to simple games, however, the aforementioned amalgamation property makes use of collusion transformation for which simple games are not closed in general. I.e., given (N, v) ∈ SG a game with externalities, and i, j ∈ N , we have that
is not in general a simple game, as it can be immediately seen from an inspection of Eq. (8).
In the remaining part of this section, we tackle the imbalance mentioned for simple games between the above value, on the one hand, and the (desired) amalgamation neutrality property, on the other hand, by means of three steps. First, we show that there do exist reasonable amalgamation neutrality properties in the spirit of Λ-dnp that are meaningful in the framework of simple games. Second, for each Λ that satisfies certain mild properties, we define a new value for arbitrary partition function form games, which we call the modified Λ-Banzhaf value. This value is in general different than the Λ-Banzhaf value, although both values coincide when there are no externalities. Third, we show that the modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique valueeither within the framework of simple games or the framework of all games -that satisfies a certain amalgamation neutrality property and, additionally, either dpp(w) or 2-psp.
A different amalgamation neutrality property
In the following, we modify the property Λ-dnp in a way that it turns out to be meaningful within the framework of simple games. To do so, it is convenient to assume that Λ is such that in many circumstances there is always a unique coalition structure that is the most likely configuration. Formally, this translates into two technical requirements. First, given N ⊆ Ω and S ⊆ N , we assume that there exists a unique P N,S ∈ P(N ) with S ∈ P N,S such that
Second, given N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N and (S, P ) ∈ EC N−j , we assume that there exists a unique
Additionally, we say that Λ is consistent for simple games if for every N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N and
where
Thus, Λ is consistent for simple games if given some S ⊆ N −j , the most likely configuration of players in N −j \ S according to Λ is independent of whether we consider j or not. We let L SG denote the set of Λ that satisfy Eqs. (2), (18), (19), and (21). 11 We stress that L SG = ∅ as it contains the two Λ defined in Example 2.1.
We are now in the position to introduce the modified {ij}-reduced game, which we denote by (N −j ,ṽ (Λ,ij) ) ∈ G N−j and is defined, for every (S, P ) ∈ EC N−j , by
It is a matter of straightforward calculations to check that (N −j ,ṽ (Λ,ij) ) is a simple game if (N, v) is a simple game. When no confusion may arise, we write (N −j ,ṽ ij ) instead of (N −j ,ṽ (Λ,ij) ).
Finally, we consider the following amalgamation neutrality property, which can be seen as one natural adaptation of Λ-dnp into the framework of simple games. 
Another family of values
Next, we introduce a new family of values for arbitrary games, although we focus our attention primarily on simple games. Indeed, note that given a simple game (N, v) ∈ SG and Λ ∈ L SG , the coalitional game (N, v Λ ) defined in Eq. (5) is not in general a simple game. Given (N, v) ∈ G N and Λ ∈ L SG , we can alternatively define the game (N,ṽ Λ ) such that, for each S ⊆ N , 
11 Without Eqs. (18) and (19), we would need to assume that P(M ), with M ⊆ Ω, can be completely and exogenously ordered. This complete order would then serve as a tie-breaking rule in the event that two partitions are equally likely. 12 Note that different Λ define the same amalgamation game as long as the relative likelihood of coalition structures remains unaltered. 13 Note that different Λ define the same coalitional game as long as the relative likelihood of coalition structures remains unaltered.
It is immediate to check that when (N, v) ∈ G is a coalitional game, i.e., it considers no externalities, we haveBa 
More characterization results
We are now in the position to prove two results that characterize the modified Λ-Banzhaf value within the framework of simple games. Proof. First, to prove existence, we can simply repeat the proof of Proposition 3.1, which now hinges on
In order to prove Eq. (25), let i, j ∈ N and S ⊆ N −j . We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: i ∈ S.
In this case, let P * := P N−j ,S ∈ P(N −j ) be such that S ∈ P * and P * −S = arg max
where the second equality holds by Eq. (2). On the one hand,
Therefore, Eq. (25) holds.
As in the previous case, let P * := P N−j ,S ∈ P(N −j ) be such that S ∈ P * and
Additionally, let P * * := P N,S ∈ P(N ) be such that S ∈ P * * and
where T * = T N,j,(S,P * ) , i.e.,
Lastly, from Eqs. (20) and (21) it follows that P * * −T * * = P * −T * , hence implying that P * * −T * * ∪ T * * = P * −T * ∪ T * +j . As a consequence, Eq. (25) holds.
Second, in order to prove uniqueness for n = 2, it suffices to repeat the argument of Corollary 9 in Casajus (2012) , noting that his proof for the case n = 2 only considers coalitional games,
i.e. games without externalities. The induction argument is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Following the main lines of the proof of the above theorem, we can also obtain the next result. In combination with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, the two above results permit us comparing the two families of values introduced in this paper. On the one hand, we see that demandingΛ-dnp(s) leads to a value, namelyBa Λ , defined in a way that the information contained in Λ is aggregated too abruptly, as opposed to Ba Λ , where the information contained in Λ is aggregated following an average approach. 15 On the other hand,Ba Λ , but not Ba Λ , is characterized by the same two results in the framework of all games and in the framework of simple games. As a consequence, depending on the specific setting where we want to consider our values, either one or the other value will be more suitable.
Lastly, we want to point out that Theorem 4.2 is interesting from the point of view of the study of the distribution of power in legislatures. Indeed, we say that i ∈ N has veto power within (N, v) if v({S, P }) = 1 implies i ∈ S. Then, consider the following property that a value on SG might satisfy:
2-vpb A value on SG, f, satisfies the veto property for bilateral systems if for every N ⊆ Ω with n = 2 and (N, v) ∈ SG where only one player, i ∈ N , has veto power,
The appeal of the above property within two-party systems is quite obvious -see e.g. May (1952) . Corollary 4.3 below reveals that if we require the latter property to hold for two-party systems and we want the distribution of power to be (on expectation according to Λ) unaffected by the party agreements that may subscribed within a multi-party system, only one possibility remains: the modified Λ-Banzhaf value. Proof. By repeating the induction argument in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can focus our attention to simple games (N, v) ∈ SG with n = 2. Note that there are only four such games.
Indeed, let w.l.o.g. N = {1, 2}. Then, (N, e (∅, * ) ), (N, e ({1}, * ) ), (N, e ({2}, * ) ) and (N, e (N, * ) ) are the only simple games that exist. Moreover, since n = 2, they are all coalitional games. For coalitional games,Λ-dnp(s) implies symmetry for any Λ. 17 In particular, for every N with n = 2 and (N, v) ∈ SG where either all players have veto power or no player does, f i (N, v) = f j (N, v) for all i, j ∈ N . That is, a value that satisfiesΛ-dnp(s) and 2-mpb within SG is uniquely determined for (N, e (∅, * ) ), (N, e ({1}, * ) ), (N, e ({2}, * ) ) and (N, e (N, * ) ).
